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Abstract
The "ladder of investment" is a regulatory approach proposed by Martin Cave (2006), which
has been widely embraced by national regulatory authorities in the European telecommunications
sector. The approach entails providing entrants, successively, with diﬀerent levels of access -the
"rungs" of the investment ladder, while inducing them to climb the ladder by setting an access
charge that increases over time or by withdrawing access obligations after some pre-determined
date (i.e., by setting sunset clauses). Proponents of the ladder of investment approach claim that
such regulatory measures would make service-based entry and facility-based entry complements—
albeit they have been traditionally viewed as substitutes—in promoting competition. The regulators,
thus, have shown a strong interest in this approach. In this paper, we provide a critical review of
the ladder of investment approach by setting out its two underlying assumptions and discussing
their validity with references to the related industrial organization literature.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
According to the traditional view, service-based entry and facility-based entry are two alternative ways
to promote competition in the telecommunications sector. The rationale is that, once entrants rely
on the incumbent’s infrastructure to provide their services, the resulting proﬁts would destroy any
incentive to build an alternative infrastructure. Regulators therefore face a trade-oﬀ: while service-
based entry promotes competition in the short-run, the full beneﬁts of competition would be achieved
in the longer-run only with facility-based entry to the market.
In 2001, with a report to the European Commission, Martin Cave proposed an original regulatory
approach to solve this dilemma: the ladder of investment (LOI).1 The basic principle of the LOI
approach consists of gradually oﬀering potential entrants diﬀerent levels of access to the incumbent’s
network. The entrants begin with acquiring access at a level which requires little investment to provide
their services (e.g., resale level). Then, as the entrants’ customer bases grow, they are encouraged to
invest in the network elements necessary to bypass this ﬁrst level of access. The entrants then climb
the investment ladder, and acquire access at the next level, and so on.
Since its introduction, the LOI approach has rapidly gained a strong inﬂuence in the European
telecommunications policy arena. For instance, in its 2006 annual report, the French regulator ARCEP
cited the LOI as a key element of its regulatory policy since 2004.2 In 2005, the European Regulators
Group (ERG) also used this approach to analyze the development of the broadband market in 13
European countries. The ERG argued that the approach was implemented in most of the EU countries,
and that there has been a [positive] relationship between the implementation of the LOI approach and
the pace of development of the broadband market (ERG, 2005).3
Two prominent professional organizations in the sector, the European Competitive Telecommu-
nications Association (ECTA) and European Telecommunications Network Operators (ETNO), have
expressed opposing views on the LOI approach. ECTA, which represents new entrants in the sector,
shares the vision of the ERG that the LOI has contributed to the development of competition in
the broadband market in some European countries.4 ETNO, which represents the incumbent ﬁrms,
1Cave’s report was subsequently revised and published under the title "Remedies for Broadband Services" (2004),
he then detailed his concept in an article, "Encouraging infrastructure competition via the ladder of investment" (Cave,
2006). Some of the ideas were also developed in earlier articles by Cave and Prosperetti (2001) and Cave and Vogelsang
(2003).
2According to ARCEP, "the development of competition in France since 1998 is a good illustration of the theory of
the ladder of investment". See ARCEP (2007), p. 36.
3ERG (2005) writes: "[the ladder of investment] explains recent developments in European broadband markets quite
well and can serve as a good regulatory model" (ERG, 2005, p. 1). We found the ﬁrst explicit mention of the ladder of
investment by the ERG in a document published one year earlier, in "ERG Remedies" (ERG, 2004a).
4See, for example, ECTA (2006).
2questions the eﬀectiveness of the LOI and points at its weak theoretical foundations and the lack of
supporting empirical evidence.5 According to ETNO, the LOI approach would actually delay invest-
ment by new entrants and maintain a fragmented and ineﬃcient market structure. ETNO does not,
however, provide any theoretical or empirical foundations for their claims either.
A sound criticism of the LOI approach comes from Oldale and Padilla (2004), who set out four
propositions that should hold altogether for the LOI approach to succeed: (1) facility-based competi-
tion is the only means to sustainable competition in telecommunications, (2) service-based competition
is a necessary prerequisite for infrastructure competition, (3) service-based competition is only possi-
ble through a regulated infrastructure, and (4) the trade-oﬀ between service-based competition and
facility-based competition is reconciled by the "ladder of investment." According to Oldale and Padilla,
the plausibility of these propositions boils down to the question of whether the regulators have the
information, time, and competence to micro-manage the evolution of a market from service-based to
facility-based.
In this paper, we do not argue whether facility-based competition is the only form of competition
that can be self-sustainable,6 we rather begin with the presumption that the realization of facility-based
competition is indeed desirable from the social welfare point of view. Also, we do not view Propositions
(2) and (3) of Oldale and Padilla as underlying assumptions of the LOI approach. According to our take
on it, the LOI approach does not claim service-based competition as a necessary prerequisite for facility-
based competition. Instead, it claims that service-based competition (through the implementation
of the LOI approach) would be a suﬃcient condition to achieve facility-based competition -though
not necessary.7 Additionally, even if service-based competition can be achieved in the absence of
regulation, there would still be a role for the LOI approach, as it involves the regulatory task of
"burning up" the rungs (neutralizing the replacement eﬀect) as much as it involves placing higher
rungs on the investment ladder (providing the entrants with higher access levels).8 Finally, rephrasing
Proposition (4) of Oldale and Padilla confers the ultimate aim of the LOI approach: reconciling
the trade-oﬀ between service-based competition and facility-based competition, i.e., ensuring that
favorable conditions for the former does not hinder the latter.
In this paper, we lay out two key assumptions of the underlying mechanism of the LOI approach9:
5See, for example, ETNO (2005).
6This is Proposition (1) in Oldela and Padilla (2004).
7In the absence of service-based competition, one could still expect facility-based entry if, for example, costs of
investing in alternative infrastructures become suﬃciently low, or if the facility-based entry is heavily subsidized.
8Oldale and Padilla implicity put an emphasis on the latter task. However, even if the regulators were not eﬀectively in
charge of the this task (say, because the incumbent ﬁr m sh a dp r i v a t ei n c e n t i v e st op r o v i d eaccess to their infrastructure),
the former task would still be key in achieving facility-based competition.
9W ef o c u so nC a v e ’ so r i g i n a ld e s c r i p t i o no ft h ea p p r o a c h . As we discuss later, some policy makers have adopted a
3i) service-based competition serves as a stepping stone to facility-based entry if the replacement eﬀect
is neutralized, and ii) the regulator has the instruments to neutralize the replacement eﬀect. Note
that these assumptions are crucial even in the absence of any problems regarding implementation.I n
other words, even in a "perfect" world where the regulators have complete information and capacity
to take necessary decisions and can overcome any commitment issues they might face in implementing
the LOI approach, the approach would not achieve its end unless these two assumptions are not valid.
We discuss the validity of these assumptions with references to the related industrial organization
literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we begin by describing the
LOI approach. In Section 3, we unfold the two key assumptions of the LOI approach and brieﬂy
review the related empirical literature. In Section 4 we touch on the constraints that might limit the
implementation of LOI and also discuss other related concerns. Finally, we conclude.
2 The Ladder of Investment
In a nutshell, the ladder of investment can be deﬁned as a regulatory approach on one-way access which
ensures that service-based entry and facility-based entry are complements in promoting competition.
That is, by adopting the LOI approach, a regulator reconciles the trade-oﬀ between promoting two
forms of competition, and hence, short-term gains from service-based competition can be realized
without impeding facility-based entry in the longer term. It is important to note that the LOI approach
put forth by Cave (2006) does not presume that service-based competition is a stepping stone to
facility-based entry per se, rather, it describes how this could be achieved with regulation.10 Neither
does it claim that the approach itself is the unique way to achieve facility-based competition.
In line with most regulators in industrialized countries, Cave (2006) regards facility-based com-
petition as the only means to achieve sustainable competition.11 Facility-based competition creates
a superior potential for service and product innovations than does service-based competition, where
entrant ﬁrms rely on the incumbent’s infrastructure in providing their services.12 Perhaps, more impor-
tantly, as (almost) each operator obtains complete control over the infrastructure it uses, facility-based
modiﬁed version of the LOI approach proposed by Cave.
10As we discuss in Section 3, this is a point which seems to be overlooked in some of the empirical studies that test
the validity of the LOI approach.
11See Oldale and Padilla (2004) for a discussion on this: Among others, they cite ERG and the former Commissioner
Mario Monti, both of whom argue that facility-based competition is the only form of competition that is self-sustainable.
12For instance, Oftel (2001) writes: "Competition at the infrastructure level should in turn feed through to competition
in the provision of services, providing consumers with a choice of packages, pricing structures and customer service
options."
4competition is also expected to lead to a partial -if not complete- deregulation of the sector. There
is also empirical support of the positive impact of facility-based entry on competitive outcomes, often
measured by the penetration rate, in the context of the broadband market. A number of studies
show that facility-based competition between a DSL network and a cable network leads to a higher
penetration than service-based competition.13
Nevertheless, facility-based competition is unlikely to develop very rapidly due to high network
costs and/or the fact that telecommunications markets are by and large dominated by historical
operators. Therefore, some form of "transitory entry assistance" might be necessary.14 Service-based
competition can play this role,15 allowing new entrants to obtain access to the incumbent’s network,
which reduces the entry costs and therefore, competition develops more quickly.
The potential problem with promoting competition with access regulation is that once entrants
enjoy proﬁts from service-based competition, their incentives to invest in their own infrastructures
may be hindered, in particular, if access prices are set too low. This is because proﬁts obtained under
service-based competition represent an opportunity cost to facility-based entry, which creates a so-
called "replacement eﬀect"16 that has been pointed out by many studies.17 Cave (2006) himself also
acknowledges this potential problem: "if comprehensive access products are too cheap, competitive
investment will not materialize," as he puts it. Therefore, two forms of entry end up as substitutes in
promoting competition (i.e., favorable conditions for service-based entry hinders facility-based entry),
and the regulator is then forced to choose whether to promote service-based competition or facility-
based competition.
The LOI approach aims at solving this dilemma so that service-based competition can be promoted
(and hence its beneﬁts can be enjoyed) without hindering the incentives for facility-based entry. Even
better, the implementation of the approach would promote facility-based entry.
With the LOI approach, new entrants are provided with transitory entry assistance, and they
are incentivized to build their own networks in the medium or long run.18 With the transitory entry
13See Aron and Burnstein (2003) for the evidence in the US, and Distaso et al. (2006) and Höﬄer (2007) for the EU.
14This argument was heard in the US too. According to the FCC: "[Congress] recognized implicitly that the purchase
of unbundled network elements would, at least in some situations, serve as a transitional arrangement until ﬂedging
competitors could develop a customer base and complete the construction of their own networks" (FCC, 1999, §6).
15As we mentioned above, according to the LOI approach, service-based competition is just one way to achieve this
goal. Alternatively, the government could, for example, subsidize entrants’ investments in infrastructure to encourage
facility-based competition.
16Originally, the replacement eﬀect was ﬁrst introduced by Arrow (1962) in the innovation literature. Everything else
constant, a monopoly ﬁrm is argued to have lower incentives to invest in drastic innovations than a competitive ﬁrm, as
it involves "replacing itself." See Tirole (1988).
17See Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2005, 2006) and the references cited in these two articles. See also Hori and Mizuno (2006)
and Vareda and Hoernig (2007), who ﬁnd a similar eﬀect in investment races between ex-ante symmetric ﬁrms.
18In the words of ERG: "The framework’s concept of the ladder of investment links a pro-competitive regulation with
5assistance, the regulator takes the necessary measures to ensure that any signiﬁcant replacement eﬀect
resulting from service-based competition would be only transient. The regulator gives the entrant an
initial "lift up" on the investment ladder by ensuring its access to the incumbent’s infrastructure at
reasonable terms, but then, to make sure that the entrant climbs up the ladder, the regulator gives it
another lift up to the next rung. This second time, lifting up the entrant involves not only ensuring
its access to the incumbent’s infrastructure at a higher level, but also burning up the rung on which
the entrant was standing (that is, neutralizing the replacement eﬀect). The entrant would then make
the necessary infrastructure investment to climb up to the next highest rung. The process continues
until the entrant reaches the top of the ladder (i.e., until it by-passes all parts of the incumbent’s
infrastructure), after which point facility-based competition begins. As the entrant’s investments take
place progressively, i.e., are spread over time, facility-based entry is achieved without the entrant
having to incur very high investment costs at once.
Typically, the ﬁrst level of access to the incumbent’s infrastructure is set at a level which requires
the lowest investment by new entrants, e.g., resale. The terms of access are regulated to ensure that
the phase of service-based competition begins and the entrants start building their customer bases.
When the regulator deems by-passing this part of the incumbent’s infrastructure economically feasible,
it lifts up the entrant to the next rung.19
Note that, according to Cave’s original LOI approach, regardless of the instrument is used to burn
up the rungs, only one level of access to the incumbent’s network is available to new entrants at
any given time. The ERG, as well as many national regulators, have embraced a modiﬁed version
of this original approach -one which ensures provision of access to the entrant at multiple levels at
any given time.20 According to the ERG, the coexistence of multiple levels of access is necessary due
to the presence of geographical diﬀerences in telecoms markets and to the fact that diﬀerent levels
of access may correspond to diﬀerent business models or phases of market entry.21 The underlying
diﬀerence between Cave’s approach and the one which is widely adopted by regulators is fundamental,
as the presence of multiple access levels may hinder the regulators’ ability to lift up the entrant to
higher rungs on the investment ladder. Furthermore, due to the potential price-squeezing practices,
investment which in turn is pushing broadband penetration, in other words a virtuous circle is created." (ERG, 2006).
19For broadband networks, for instance, the diﬀerent rungs might signify access to the copper local loop and the
incumbent’s IP network.
20ERG claims that "the more complete the chain of available access products is, the higher the competitive dynamic is
(e.g. France, UK, Spain)" (ERG, 2005, p. 1). The French regulator ARCEP emphasizes the need to maintain multiple
levels of access to help entrants have a national coverage (see: ARCEP (2007)). New entrants have also argued in favor
of multiple levels of access (see: ECTA (2006)).
21For example, for the broadband market, ERG (2004b) states: "[Bitstream access and local loop unbundling] may ﬁt
as diﬀerent input products for diﬀerent business models or for diﬀerent phases of market entry."
6regulators should be diligent in their access price regulation, as consistency across diﬀerent levels of
access is now necessary. In the remainder of the paper we will focus on the original approach of the
LOI as outlined by Cave (2006).
3 Two critical assumptions of the LOI approach
In our view, the mechanism underlying the LOI approach is based on two key assumptions, which are
as follows
Assumption 1. Service-based competition serves as a stepping stone to facility-based entry if the
replacement eﬀect is neutralized.
Assumption 2. The regulator has the instruments to neutralize the replacement eﬀect.
Note that unless both assumptions are satisﬁed, the LOI approach will most likely fail, even in
the absence of any obstacles that might hinder its implementation. Below, we discuss these two
assumptions.
3.1 The stepping-stone hypothesis
According to the ﬁrst assumption of the LOI approach, in the absence of any (signiﬁcant) replacement
eﬀects, service-based competition is a stepping-stone to facility-based entry. For this to be true, there
must be beneﬁts of competing on the basis of services that accrue in the longer term—upon the entrant’s
facility-based entry. Note that, even if the aforementioned beneﬁts exist, service-based competition
may not serve as a stepping-stone to facility-based entry, unless such beneﬁts are relatively large
compared to the replacement eﬀect. This is why we consider the regulatory task of neutralizing the
replacement eﬀect as a precondition to the stepping-stone hypothesis.
Two signiﬁcant beneﬁts that facility-based entrants may enjoy by engaging in service-based com-
petition prior to their entry relate to (i) building a customer base and reputation, and (ii) resolution
of uncertainty in the market conditions (e.g., demand, technology). The ERG (2004a) highlights both:
"Due to the high risk involved in investments with a high share of sunk costs, alterna-
tive operators are likely to follow a step-by-step approach, continuously expanding their
customer base and infrastructure investments. The initial availability of the incumbent’s
infrastructure at low prices will make it easier for alternative operators to enter the market
7and develop a customer base. Equipped with a customer base, uncertainty is considerably
reduced and the operator may then be ready to take further investments."
Moreover, the incumbent ﬁrms may have superior technologies (e.g., in production, marketing,
etc.) due to their accumulated experience in the market over the years, and hence, without acquiring
comparable experience, entrants might not ﬁnd facility-based entry viable. Therefore, a phase of
service-based competition can give entrants a chance to invest in experience before investing in their
own physical infrastructure. Since the beneﬁts of learning by doing accrue in the longer term, the
phase of service-based competition may, indeed, serve as a stepping-stone to facility-based entry.
In the theoretical literature, the stepping stone argument has two slightly diﬀerent readings. Ac-
c o r d i n gt oi t sﬁrst reading, having a service-based competition phase ensures facility-based compe-
tition, which would not emerge in the absence of such a phase. A set of studies with two-period
competition models study how having service-based competition in the ﬁrst period aﬀects the incen-
tives for facility-based entry in the subsequent period. According to its second reading, service-based
competition accelerates facility-based entry, which otherwise would emerge at a later time. Studies
that adopt competition models with an inﬁnite horizon, study how the timing of facility-based entry
can be inﬂuenced by a preceding phase of service-based competition.
Below, we refer to both sets of theoretical studies that touch on one of the two beneﬁts that favors
the stepping stone argument in the telecoms setting.
Progressive acquisition of market share and reputation Bourreau and Drouard (2009) provide
a dynamic model, where the service-based entrant gradually acquires a market share. The progressive
acquisition of its market share can be explained by increasing consumer awareness of the entrant’s
services over time. Alternatively, the entrant’s quality of service may initially be perceived as inferior
to that of the incumbent, but consumers may gain a better assessment of it over time. The entrant
could also build reputation over time, which would increase the consumers’ willingness to pay for its
services.
In this setting, as the entrant gradually builds a customer base during the phase of service-based
competition, this phase can serve as a stepping stone to facility-based entry, despite the replacement
eﬀect it creates. However, Bourreau and Drouard show that the phase of service-based competition
does not necessarily accelerate the facility-based entry of the entrant. This is because the entrant might
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to prolong the phase of service-based competition to accumulate a larger customer
base. The proﬁtability of this strategy depends on whether facility-based entry would occur earlier
or later without a phase of service-base competition. The authors show that having service-based
8competition prior to facility-based competition accelerates (slows down) facility-based entry if the
cost of building a new infrastructure declines suﬃciently rapidly (slowly).
Avenali et al (2009) consider a two-period setting, where the cost of building infrastructure is
suﬃciently high and facility-based entry is not feasible unless the entrant competes on the basis of
services in the ﬁrst period and builds reputation on its quality of service. In other words, the authors
consider a setting where service-based competition in the ﬁrst period is a prerequisite for facility-based
entry. They then study the impact of access pricing on the entrant’s incentive to invest in its own
infrastructure in the second period, and show that an access price that increases over time is key to
achieve facility-based entry. Therefore, although building a reputation through a phase of service-
based competition may be a necessary condition (as assumed by Avenali et al at the out set), it may
not be suﬃcient to ensure that service-based competition serves as a stepping stone to facility-based
entry. As we noted earlier, the replacement eﬀect should be restrained -if not neutralized- to make sure
that facility-based competition emerges.22 Having said that, as the analysis by Bourreau and Drouard
shows, neutralizing the replacement eﬀect, alone, might not be suﬃcient to bring about facility-based
entry at the socially desirable date.
Resolution of uncertainty Prior to entering the market, entrants might face some uncertainty,
for example, about the state of the demand or their own costs,23 which make the returns to their
investments highly uncertain.
Schutz and Tregouët (2008) consider a two-period model with an entrant, who is uncertain about
its marginal cost and who can enter the market in either with service-based competition or facility-
based competition. The uncertainty is resolved with service-based competition in the ﬁrst period,
after which the entrant decides whether or not to build its own facility. When facility-based entry
is viable (i.e., if the cost of building infrastructure is not too high), the resolution of such an uncer-
tainty can be either good or bad news for infrastructure investments. If the entrant obtains favorable
information on its marginal cost, the service-based competition serves as a stepping stone to facility-
based competition. Otherwise, facility-based entry may be hindered by having a preliminary phase
of service-based competition. That is, an entrant who would build its own facility in the absence of
service based competition (that is, in the absence of "bad news" of its cost structure), would remain
22One potential drawback of two-period models, is that they cannot address the question of how the timing of the
facility-based entry can be eﬀected by the terms of service-based competition.
23Vareda (2007), for example, studies a two-period model, where the entrant learns about the state of demand once it
enters in the market. Therefore, service-based competition in the ﬁrst period resolves the uncertainty of demand, after
which the entrant decides whether or not to build its facility. Since Vareda’s focus is on the asymmetric information
between the service-based entrant and the regulator, we do not review the paper in this section.
9as a service-based competitor in the second period. Note that, however, bad news for the entrant, may
be good news for the society, as facility-based entry by relatively ineﬃcient ﬁrms would be prevented
as service-based entry resolves the uncertainty.
3.2 Instruments to neutralize the replacement eﬀect
As we mentioned earlier, lifting up the entrants to the next (higher) rung requires (i) the existence of
such next rung to step on (i.e., access to the incumbent’s infrastructure at a higher level at reasonable
terms), and (ii) burning up the preceding rung on the ladder (i.e., neutralizing the replacement eﬀect
created by the current level of access to the incumbent’s facility), simultaneously.24 Since regulators
can achieve the former task by standard means of access regulation, we focus on the latter task, and
discuss whether regulators have the necessary tools to accomplish it.
Cave proposes two alternatives tools to neutralize the replacement eﬀect: (i) setting an access
charge that increases over time, which gradually burns up the rung (or reduces the replacement eﬀect
over time), and (ii) setting a sunset clause at the given access level, that is, by committing to deregulate
the access to the given rung after a pre-determined date, after which the rung burns up immediately.
Diﬀerent studies favor one instrument over the other.25
Note that these instruments are typically discussed in the context of broadband markets, where
there are signiﬁcant asymmetries between the incumbent, who owns an infrastructure, and the entrant,
who initially does not own one. Some markets, however, display a more symmetric structure, in that
neither of the ﬁrms initially own an infrastructure (for example, next generation access networks). In
this section we focus on the asymmetric markets, and defer the discussion on symmetric markets to
Section 4.
Access price regulation Cave argues that one way to incentivize the entrants to climb to the
next rung is to increase the access charge of the current access level over time.26 Indeed, the impact
of access charges on the entrants’ investment decisions is well-recognized in the telecommunications
24In Cave’s words: " ... entrants are encouraged to climb the ladder driven both by the attractiveness of the rungs
above (relative to staying where they are) and by fear that the rung on which they are currently standing will be less
comfortable." See Cave (2006).
25For example, Hausman and Sidak (2005) recommend regulators to allow the prices (for ﬁxed unbundled elements) to
increase over time in order to achieve transition to facility-based competition. Whereas Jorde, Sidak and Teece (2000)
suggest that mandatory unbundling should sunset after the passage of two years or upon the entry of a facility-based
competitor.
26There is also a literature on the impact of access prices on the incumbents’ investment incentives which we do not
review in this paper. See Section 3.2 of Cambini and Jiang (2009) for a recent review.
10literature.27 The conventional wisdom is that the higher the access price (i.e., the lower the service-
based proﬁts of the entrant are), the greater the incentives for an entrant to invest in its own network,
as the opportunity cost of facility-based entry decreases with a higher access charge.
According to Sappington (2005), this general view, i.e., the impact of access charges on make-or-
buy decisions of entrants, is rather a presumption. In a Hotelling setting, he shows that the access
price has no inﬂuence on the make or buy decision of an entrant, which is always eﬃcient,28 regardless
of the level of access price. What leads to this somewhat striking result is the quasi-inelastic feature of
the demand in the Hotelling model: if the incumbent gains one customer in the retail market (under
service-based competition), it loses exactly one customer in the wholesale market. Therefore, the
perceived marginal costs of the incumbent and the entrant are equal to the access charge plus their
downstream cost. Since equilibrium proﬁts do not depend on the perceived marginal costs, they do
not depend on the access price either. Consequently, the incentives for the entrant to build its own
infrastructure do not depend on the access price.
Gayle and Weisman (2007) argue that Sappington’s result does not hold if one adopts diﬀerent
types of competition models than Hotelling (e.g., Bertrand competition with vertical diﬀerentiation,
or Cournot competition). Although this is a valid point, the take away from Sappington’s paper is
that the (positive) relationship between the access charge and the make-or-buy decisions should not
be taken for granted.
Both Sappington (2005) and Gayle and Weisman (2007) study investment incentives of the entrants
in a static framework. In a dynamic setting, Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2005) have shown that the access
charge may inﬂuence the facility-based entry date of the entrant. Therefore, when the regulator sets the
access charge, it faces a trade-oﬀ: on the one hand, a high (low) access charge speeds up (slows down)
facility-based entry, but it also reduces (increases) the consumer surplus in the phase of service-based
competition. Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2006) propose a formal model to analyze the eﬀect of service-based
competition on facility-based entry, and show that an access charge increasing over time can resolve
this trade-oﬀ.29 At the social optimum, the regulator sets the access fee that maximizes the welfare
ﬂows until the optimal date of investment; from that date on, the regulator sets an access charge high
enough or, equivalently, bans access to the incumbent’s network, so that the investment takes place.
27E.g., see Gruber (2007). For a general discussion of the relation between access pricing and investment, see also Cave
and Vogelsang (2003), Valletti (2003) and Guthrie (2006).
28That is, the entrant decides to bypass the incumbent’s network if and only if it can produce the upstream input at
a lower cost than the incumbent.
29Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2006) propose a formal model of investment with a vertically-integrated operator and an
entrant, in which the investment cost decreases over time, and where the incumbent or the regulator can commit to a
time-dependent access charge.
11In a more recent paper, Avenali et al. (2009) use a two-period model and also show that an
access charge that increases over time can be critical to entrants’ incentives to invest in alternative
infrastructures. Diﬀerent than Bourreau and Do˘ gan, they assume that the ability of the entrant to
engage in facility-based competition depends on the phase of service-based competition, during which
the entrant builds its reputation. They also consider sequential entry, and argue that the access price
should not only depend on time but also on the entry period to ensure that each entrant is provided
with the same access price schedule.
Although there are no other theoretical studies that deal with this question, those few that exist
support Cave’s suggestion that an access price that increases over time, may indeed burn up the rung
in question (i.e., neutralize the replacement eﬀect) over time.
Sunset clauses A sunset clause is a predetermined deadline after which access to the incumbent’s
network will no longer be regulated. The main purpose of a sunset clause is to make service-based
competition less attractive for new entrants after a certain period of time (set by the sunset clause),
and hence, to give them the incentives to build their own infrastructure. This mechanism implicitly
assumes that with the deregulation of access, the incumbent would set a higher commercial rate—or
would even deny access by setting a prohibitive access price—and hence, the entrants would build their
own infrastructures.
Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2006) show that sunset clauses are ineﬀective if the competition between
the incumbent and the entrant is more intense under facility-based competition than under service-
based competition. The idea is that if facility-based entry represents a threat for the incumbent, in
the absence of access regulation (or upon removal of it after the sunset) the incumbent provides the
entrant with favorable conditions for access—as opposed to setting too high a price for it. By doing
so, the incumbent increases the entrant’s opportunity cost of building an alternative infrastructure,
and hence retards facility-based entry. In a similar vein, Avenali et al (2009) also show that a sunset
clause dilutes the investment incentives of the entrant, and hence, is counterproductive.
Implementation of sunset clauses also raise a problem of commitment, which we discuss in Section
4.
Banning access? As we mentioned above, Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2006) argue that the regulator
could ban access to the incumbent’s network (or set too high a price for it) after the desired date
for facility-based entry, instead of committing to remove regulation at that date. Such a regulatory
12strategy will be socially desirable when the entrants do not have the incentives to climb up the ladder,30
as such a ban would indeed burn up the rung in question and force entrants to climb up to the next
rung on the ladder. Having said that, banning access to the incumbent’s infrastructure may not be
practical.31 Avenali et al. (2009) also point out that this strategy is not very realistic.
3.3 Empirical evidence
Testing the validity of the LOI empirically is very challenging, mainly because of the imperfections in
its implementation. As we have been emphasizing in the paper so far, the approach requires regulators
to neutralize the replacement eﬀect to the extent that service-based competition serves as a stepping
stone to facility-based competition. Also, as Cambini and Jiang (2009) put it, the lack of data at the
local exchange level does not permit one to attain empirical estimates of the evolution of diﬀerent
modes of entry over time. An ideal test of the LOI approach would both use micro-data at the local
exchange level and focus on countries where access regulation (at the very least) resembles that laid
out by the LOI approach. To our knowledge, there is no study that meets both criteria.
A number of studies look at the relationship between the two modes of entry, and reject the
stepping stone hypothesis. For example, Hausmann and Sidak (2004) focus on ﬁve countries, the US,
the UK, New Zealand, Canada and Germany (from1993 to 2003), and test whether entrants migrate
progressively towards facility-based competition. They conclude that there is no evidence of such
a migration, and hence no evidence for the LOI hypothesis. Hazlett and Bazelon (2005) use data
from US states (from December 1999 to December 2004), and reject the stepping stone hypothesis
as they do not ﬁnd evidence that regulated unbundled access leads to facility-based competition.32
Crandall and Sidak (2007) use data from 15 European countries (from 2002 to September 2006), and
test whether the ratio of LLU-based lines to the total number of new entrants’ service-based lines
increases over time.33 They ﬁnd that this is the case in only nine countries out of ﬁfteen during this
period. Additionally, they ﬁnd a crossover point between bitstream access and LLU during the period
for only ﬁve countries out of these nine.34 They then conduct a case study on these ﬁve countries, and
30See Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2006) for the analysis in an asymmetric framework with one vertically-integrated ﬁrm (the
incumbent) and one pure downstream ﬁrm (the entrant). Vareda and Hoernig (2007) propose a similar analysis in a
symmetric setting with two ex-ante identical ﬁrms.
31Perhaps, an irony here is that meeting the long term target of deregulation (via encouraging facility-based competi-
tion) would involve a very heavy-handed regulation in the short-term.
32They use the number of facility-based lines as the dependent variable and ﬁnd that the lagged values of the number
of service-based lines have an ambiguous eﬀect; there is no eﬀect of service-based lines one period earlier, a negative
eﬀect for the number of lines two periods earlier, and ﬁnally a positive eﬀect for the number of lines there periods earlier
lags. It seems diﬃcult to interpret these ambiguous results.
33They do not take into account facility-based lines.
34The crossover point is deﬁned as the point in time where the share of bitstream access becomes lower than the share
13conclude that there is weak or no evidence of a LOI.
In a more recent study, Friederiszick et al (2008) use ﬁrm-level data and ﬁnd that for 180 telecom
ﬁrms in 25 European countries (from 1997 to 2006) pro-entry regulation has discouraged infrastructure
investments by the entrants in the ﬁxed-line segment.35 Similarly, Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) also
ﬁnd a negative impact of unbundling obligations on new infrastructure investments in 27 European
countries (from 2002 to 2007)
While reviewing these results, it is important to keep in mind that the LOI approach does not
claim that service-based entry and facility-based entry are complements in promoting competition,
per se. That is, it does not claim that favorable terms of service-based entry would stimulate facility-
based entry. It rather claims that implementing the LOI approach can achieve this. The stepping-stone
hypothesis underlying the LLU approach entails the neutralization of the replacement eﬀect created by
service-based competition, and it is not clear if the approach was implemented in any of the countries
in the aforementioned studies. Hence, our takeaway from them is that the perceived beneﬁts of service-
based competition that may accrue upon the entrant’s facility-based entry are less pronounced relative
to the replacement eﬀects it creates.
Ad i ﬀerent set of studies look at the relationship between access prices and facility-based invest-
ments. For example, Crandall, Ingraham and Singer (2004) show that in the US (from 2000 to 2003)
service-based competition through mandatory unbundling decreases facility-based competition, and
that the growth of facility-based lines were higher in the states where access prices were higher rel-
ative to facility-based investments. Waverman et al. (2007) use data on LLU prices and new access
lines for new entrants in 27 European countries (from 2002 to 2006), and show that a 10% reduction
in the LLU prices leads to an 18% decrease in the share of new entrants’ facility-based lines (cable,
ﬁber, WLL, etc.). These studies can be viewed as support for access price increases over time as an
eﬀective tool to mitigate the replacement eﬀect, and hence, as a validation of the second assumption
of the LOI approach we have laid out in this paper.
Finally, Distaso et al. (2008) test whether entrants climb the rungs of the LOI over time in 12
European countries (from January 2005 to July 2007). More speciﬁcally, they test whether entrants
migrate ﬁrst from bitstream access (BA) or resale oﬀers to LLU or shared access oﬀers, and then to
the development of their own access network. In parallel, they evaluate whether the change in access
prices over time is consistent with the LOI, that is, whether the ratio of BA prices to LLU prices
of LLU-based lines.
35However, Friederiszick et al. (2008) measure entry regulation with a rather general regulatory index (the Plaut
index).
14increases over time. Their graphical results suggest that in only two countries, France and Spain there
is a migration towards higher rungs of the ladder associated with increasing access charges over time
at lower rungs of the ladder.
4 Implementation of the LOI approach
In the previous Section, we focused on the underlying mechanism of the LOI approach and assumed
away any constraints the regulator might face in its implementation. In this Section, we will discuss two
major concerns that have been raised in the implementation of the approach: i) heavy informational
requirements, and ii) lack of credible commitments. We also touch on two other concerns related to
the implementation of the LOI, namely, the issues of "late" entrants, and the applicability of the LOI
approach to symmetric networks such as next generation access networks.
Cave (2006) proposes a practical method for setting up the LOI,36 which can be summarized as
follows. Before setting up the LOI, the regulator should determine the degree of replicability of each
network element. According to Cave, there are three types of network elements: network elements
that are easy to replicate, non-replicable network elements and network elements that belong to an
intermediate category. The implementation of the LOI concerns the last category.37 After identifying
the replicable elements of the network, the regulator can then implement the 6-step method of the
LOI, which involves, in particular, determining the diﬀerent rungs of the ladder and deciding on the
regulatory instruments to entice entrants to climb the ladder.38
Although the last step of Cave’s method relates to the issue of credibility, the method implicitly
assumes that regulators have the necessary information to follow the proposed steps.
4.1 Information
Oldale and Padilla (2004) provide an elaborate discussion on this major concern. They argue that the
LOI approach requires regulators to micro-manage the industry, which in turn requires a considerable
amount of information, time, and expertise. Therefore, regulators might ﬁnd it very diﬃcult to decide
on the "right sequence" of rungs of the investment ladder.
In addition to the standard problems related to the asymmetric information between the regulator
and the regulated ﬁrm, there might be problems due to the asymmetric information between the
36Gallo and Pontarollo (2005) argue that shedding light on operational concerns has been a key factor which helped
to attract the interest of European regulators to the LOI approach.
37Note that the replicability of a network element may change over time if demand or costs also change.
38See Cave (2006) for the detailed discussion on these six steps.
15regulators and the entrants, who enjoy transitional entry assistance with the LOI approach.
To our knowledge, the only study which formally raises this concern is by Vareda (2007). Vareda
considers a two-period model, where the service-based entrant, who has a superior information on
the state of the demand, can manipulate the regulator to obtain favorable access prices. This would
in turn, make the entrant reluctant to build its own infrastructure. The regulator, who is uncertain
about the demand, aims at setting an access price scheme that promotes service-based competition
in both periods if facility-based entry is not viable (which is the case if the state of demand is low
in the paper). It also aims at setting one that ensures service-based competition occurs only in the
ﬁrst period (followed by facility-based entry in the second period) if facility-based entry is viable. In
this second-best world, access price in the ﬁrst period should guarantee realization of service-based
competition during that period. The access price in the second period can be conditioned on the
market share that is captured by the entrant in the ﬁrst period, which is only an imperfect signal of
the state of demand39. It turns out that the second-best access scheme involves setting a lower price
(than the ﬁrst-best) in the ﬁrst period, and a higher price in the second period conditional on a low
market share in the ﬁrst period. By using such an access scheme, the regulator increases the cost of
shirking in the ﬁrst period and decreases the beneﬁt of shirking in the second.
One important take-away from Vareda’s paper is that asymmetric information between the service-
based entrants and the regulator (e.g., on the demand for entrants’ services) may further complicate
implementing the LOI approach, even if one assumes that the regulator possesses all the relevant
information regarding the incumbent’s infrastructure.
One can only imagine how such informational asymmetries on the cost side would also complicate
the implementation of the LOI. For example, when facing multiple potential entrants, potentially with
diﬀerent cost structures, determining the right sequence of rungs, as well as deciding on the time (and
mechanism) at which to burn existing rungs would be extremely complicated.
4.2 Credibility
The issue of credibility relates to the last step of Cave’s proposal. Cave notes that "...[a credible
commitment] is required as entrants must believe that mandated access will be temporary or that its
price will rise if they are to factor this into their investment decisions." He argues that commitments
to change the relative prices of more replicable network elements can be made credibly, if they rely
39This is because when the demand is high, the entrant might ﬁnd it proﬁtable to "shirk" in the ﬁrst period, as
obtaining a low customer base in this period might signal to the regulator that the demand is low. In turn, the regulator
would set a low access charge in the second period, from which the entrant would beneﬁt, if it remains a service-based
competitor.
16upon consistent deﬁnitions and are not made too far in advance. However, Oldale and Padilla argue
that regulators would still be likely to renege on their commitments (for example, those related to
removal of the rungs), in particular, when the entrant ﬁrm remains dependent on favorable access
terms. Indeed, experience with sunset clauses in the Netherlands and Canada conﬁrm this point.
The regulators in both countries withdrew their commitment and maintained the regulation of access
beyond the deadlines that were set by the clauses.40
Implementation of the LOI can be successful only if regulators stick their ex-ante commitment to
burn up the rungs ex-post. Avenali et al. (2009) provide a formal study of this issue. They extend their
basic model to consider sequential entry, and the regulator’s incentives to renege on its commitment to
increase the access price over time. They show that, facing a late entrant, the regulator’s commitment
to increase the access price over time would not be credible unless the regulator attaches a relatively
high value to ﬁrm’s proﬁts. They propose a remedy to this problem, which involves setting an access
price which depends not only on time, but also on the period of entry to the market. Therefore, a late
entrant would face the same access schedule as the early entrant, but one that is set at its entry date
(and not at that of the early entrant).
In the remainder of this section, we brieﬂyr e v i e wt w oo t h e rc o n c e r n st h a th a v eb e e nr a i s e di nt h e
LOI discussions.
4.3 Other concerns
4.3.1 "Late" entrants and the emergence of wholesale markets
One other concern about the implementation of the LOI approach relates to the "late entrants" to
the industry; as with the implementation of the LOI approach, there would be only one level of access
available to entrants at any given moment in time. Therefore, in the absence of an access oﬀer at low
rungs of the ladder, the entrants that enter the market at a later date would have no other possibility
of entry than by investing heavily in network elements to enter at the current (and high) level of
40OPTA, the Dutch regulatory authority, speciﬁed a ﬁve-year period after which the incumbent operator, KPN Telecom,
would be "in principle, free to set a tariﬀ on a commercial basis" (See Guidelines on Access to the Unbundled Loop, March
1999). However, OPTA announced in April 2001 that at the end of the ﬁve-year period, it would review competition in
the local loop to decide whether to continue or to stop regulating the rental rate (See OPTA (2001), and Poel (2006)
for details on LLU regulation in the Netherlands). Similarly, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission issued a decision (CRTC-97-8) in 1997, which stated that following a ﬁve-year mandatory unbundling, the
incumbent’s services and components that were deemed to be essential facilities (including local loops in certain areas)
would not be subject to mandatory unbundling and the rental rate would not be regulated any longer. In March 2001,
however, CRTC extended this sunset period without specifying a termination date (See Order CRTC 2001-184).
17access.41 As we mentioned above, Avenali et al (2009) suggest that this problem could be solved if the
access prices did not only depend on time but also on the entrant’s entry date. Putting it diﬀerently,
they suggest that the regulator should oﬀer the same ladder to each entrant upon their entry date.
This would mean that at any given time, lower rungs of the ladder would be exclusively available to
late entrants, and at similar conditions that were set for earlier entrants.42
Diﬀerently, Cave (2006), who also acknowledges this concern, argues that the most advanced
entrants would enter the wholesale market at the level of the LOI that has been deregulated. Therefore,
a competitive wholesale market would emerge, and the late entrants would be able to obtain access
at reasonable prices and beneﬁt from similar conditions to early entrants. Cave writes:
"This approach may appear harsh to later entrants, whose arrival on the scene may be
associated with less favorable access conditions—the relevant assets being deemed, by that
stage, to be replicable. However, such later entrants will have the opportunity to seek
access either from the initially dominant ﬁrm or from earlier entrants, which may have
excess capacity which they are eager to sell."
Consider an industry setting with two vertically-integrated operators and a pure service-based ﬁrm.
In this context, vertically-integrated ﬁrms would be the historical operator and the entrant which
has climbed the ladder, and the service-based ﬁrm would be a "late entrant." With this industry
conﬁguration, there may potentially be competition both at the wholesale level (between the two
vertically-integrated ﬁrms), and at the retail level (between the three ﬁrms). Then, the question is
whether a competitive wholesale market as suggested by Cave, would indeed emerge. This question,
in turn, can be broken down into two questions. First, can we expect a wholesale market to emerge
in the absence of any regulatory intervention? Second, given that such a wholesale market emerges,
can we expect it to be competitive? Ordover and Shafer (2007) and Brito and Pereira (2006) provide
insights to the ﬁrst question, whereas Bourreau et al. (2007) study the second question.
Ordover and Shafer (2007) consider a setting where one of the vertically integrated ﬁrms has a
larger customer base than the other. The new (late) entrant can enter the market only service-based,
but in two diﬀerent ways. It can either engage in "own-supplier cannibalization" (i.e., cannibalize only
the sales of its upstream supplier), or in "proportional cannibalization" (i.e., cannibalize the sales of
the two integrated ﬁrms in equal proportions). They show that there is entry in equilibrium and the
41This important issue has probably led European regulators to amend Cave’s original concept to authorize access at
various levels of the incumbent’s network at any given time.
42One potential problem with this idea is that such acces policy might not be optimal if the cost of facility-based entry
varies (for example, decreases) over time.
18wholesale market is perfectly competitive in the latter case, whereas the entrant remain out of the
market in the former (as no integrated ﬁrm makes a wholesale oﬀer).43 This is because, in the former
case, the beneﬁts from selling at the wholesale market (i.e., wholesale proﬁts) do not compensate for
the costs associated with it (i.e., the reduction in the resale proﬁts). Brito and Pereira (2006) consider
ad i ﬀerent setting with circular diﬀerentiation between the ﬁrms at retail competition, and yet obtain
similar results.
Bourreau et al. (2007) consider a similar setting to that of Ordover and Shafer (2007) and Brito
and Pereira (2006), but diﬀerently, they assume that the integrated ﬁrms cannot deter the entrant
from entering the market.44 They then study whether the wholesale market is likely to be competitive.
Their main result is that, even if a wholesale market emerges, chances are high that it will not be
competitive. They show that the competitiveness of the wholesale demand depends on the magnitude
of the "softening eﬀect," which is described as follows. When an integrated ﬁrm supplies the wholesale
market, it becomes a softer competitor in the retail market (as it internalizes the impact of a loss
of a customer in the retail market, which can be recovered in the wholesale market), which in turn,
beneﬁts the other integrated ﬁrm. In a very general setting, it turns out that the integrated ﬁrm
that serves the wholesale market makes lower retail proﬁts than its integrated rival. Therefore, an
integrated ﬁrm faces the following trade-oﬀ when it decides to serve the wholesale market: serving the
wholesale market generates additional wholesale revenues, but at the opportunity cost of lower retail
revenues. When the softening eﬀect is strong, the aforementioned opportunity cost is high, and hence,
competition is unlikely to take hold.45
The insights provided by these studies suggest that Cave’s presumption about the emergence of
a wholesale market is quite debatable. Note that, however, if a wholesale market emerges, and if it
is monopolistic, the incentives of the ﬁrst entrant to climb the ladder might actually be higher (e.g.,
as it might expect higher wholesale revenues in the future). Similarly, as the entrant’s service-based
proﬁts would be low in such a monopolistic wholesale market, its incentives to bypass the current rung
of the ladder might also be higher. Therefore, it is not clear whether the emergence of competitive
wholesale markets at the low rungs of the ladder is desirable from a social point of view. We believe
this question is an important one and deserves further research.
43Therefore, if the entrant can choose its positioning (own-supplier or proportional cannibalization) there is entry only
if the entrant can commit to its positioning.
44T h ea u t h o r sa r g u et h a tt h i sm i g h tb et h ec a s ee i t h e rw h e nt h ee ntrant has the outside option of entering facility-based,
or when there exists a regulated access oﬀer.
45The authors give an example of a competition setting with diﬀerentiated retail products and show that the wholesale
market is competitive in equilibrium if diﬀe r e n t i a t i o no nt h er e t a i lm a r k e ti sh i g henough, and is monopolistic otherwise.
194.3.2 Next generation access networks and the LOI approach
Until now, we have focused on asymmetric markets, where the incumbent ﬁrm has an infrastructure
and the entrant ﬁrms don’t. In some "symmetric" markets both, the historical operators and the new
entrants may need to invest in a new access infrastructure, for example, in next generation ﬁber-optic
networks.46
There is a relatively recent debate on whether the "leaders" in ﬁber investments should provide
"followers" with access to their infrastructure. One can argue that under such access obligations,
service-based competition may hinder the followers’ incentives to build their own infrastructure (as
well as the leaders’ incentives), and hence, may create room for the LOI approach.
Although we do not attempt to contribute to this debate in this paper and will not address whether
Cave’s LOI approach (or a modiﬁed one) is appropriate for such symmetric markets we review the
existing formal papers that study this issue.
Hori and Mizuno (2006) study a model of dynamic investment à la Dixit and Pindyck (1994) with
two ex-ante identical ﬁrms and an access obligation to the ﬁrm that invests ﬁrst (the leader). Under
certain conditions47, they show that there is "access-to-bypass" equilibria. That is, the follower begins
by leasing access to the leader’s infrastructure, and later builds its own infrastructure. They show
that a higher access price accelerates the investment by the leader, whereas it delays service-based
entry by the follower, which in turn accelerates the follower’s facility-based entry. This is because a
higher access price increases the leader’s proﬁt and reduces the follower’s proﬁt under service-based
competition. Hence, the follower delays its service-based entry. Since the opportunity cost of facility-
based entry is reduced, a higher access charge also accelerates the investment of the follower. In this
setting, therefore, similar to the asymmetric ﬁrms setting, the regulator could burn a particular rung
on the ladder by setting an access price that increases over time, or by banning access to the leader’s
network at that level.48
Vareda and Hoernig (2007) study a slightly diﬀerent model, adapted from the model of technology
adoption of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). Similar to Hori and Mizuno (2006), they consider two
symmetric ﬁrms, and study the eﬀect of an access obligation imposed on the leader of the investment
race.49 The authors show that the nature of the equilibrium depends on the access price: there is a
46The incumbent operator may own some strategic assets, such as civil engineering. However, just like the entrant
ﬁrms, it owns does not own a ﬁber optic access network prior to the investment race, which makes the ﬁrms symmetric.
47In particular, when the leader obtains a higher proﬁt under service-based competition than under facility-based
competition, and when the access price is suﬃciently low and/or the investment cost suﬃciently high.
48This point is not discussed by Hori and Mizuno (2006), but it is a direct consequence.
49Diﬀerent than Hori and Mizuno (2006), who consider a variable access charge, Vareda and Hoernig (2007) consider
a ﬁxed access charge (i.e., a lump sum transfer from the follower to the leader).
20preemption equilibrium if the access price is suﬃciently high, and a "waiting equilibrium" otherwise.
As a higher access price always accelerates the investment of the follower,50 the regulator can induce
the follower to invest at the socially-optimal date if it is likely to invest too late from a social point of
view.
However, Vareda and Hoernig (2007) argue that it is also possible that the follower invests too
soon. This could be the case, for instance, if the incentives for the follower to capture the customers
of the leader were too high (that is, if there is a "business stealing" eﬀect). The regulator could delay
the investment of the follower by lowering the access price, but it would then reduce the leader’s proﬁt
under service-based competition, and hence, it would delay the leader’s investment. To restore the
incentives for the leader to invest early, Vareda and Hoernig suggest setting up a period of "regulatory
holidays."51 The idea is to prohibit the follower from accessing the leader’s network during a period
of time starting immediately after the investment of the leader.
Given the insights provided by these studies, the regulator can use tools such as increasing access
prices, to encourage the followers to climb the ladder, just like in the asymmetric markets. However,
if followers climb the LOI too fast (which might happen if the incentives for facility-based entry are
mainly driven by a "business stealing" eﬀect) other instruments such regulatory holidays could be
used. Yet, we believe that further research is called for on the application of the LOI approach in
symmetric networks.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a critical review of the theory of the LOI approach. In our view,
the approach relies on two key assumptions. First, if the replacement eﬀect created by service-based
competition is neutralized, then service-based competition is assumed to serve as a stepping-stone to
facility-based entry. The critical point in this assumption is that the removal of the replacement eﬀect
is a precondition for the so-called stepping-stone argument. This is why it is diﬃcult to reject this
hypothesis simply by testing the relationship between two forms of competition empirically. Further-
more, there are a couple of arguments in support of this assumption from a theoretical point of view:
the beneﬁts of establishing a reputation and customer base, learning-by-doing, and gaining experience
50In contrast, the leader’s investment date depends on the nature of the equilibrium. See Vareda and Hoernig (2007)
for the details.
51In Germany, the incumbent operator, Deutsche Telekom, asked for such regulatory holidays for the deployment of
its VDSL network, which led to a dispute between the European commission and the German regulatory authority in
2006.
21in the market with service-based competition. Gaining experience in the market prior to facility-based
entry may be particularly important in the presence of any uncertainty about the market conditions.
The second key assumption of the LOI approach relates to the existence of regulatory instruments
that can neutralize the replacement eﬀect. Cave has suggested two instruments that could serve
this purpose: access prices that increase over time, and sunset clauses. Although the ﬁrst instrument
receives some support from the theoretical literature, the latter has been argued to be either ineﬀective
or counterproductive.
While the validity of these two assumptions is necessary for the success of the LOI approach, it
is far from being suﬃcient. There are additional factors that may hinder the implementation of the
LOI approach. Although the main focus of this paper is the preconditions for the functioning of
the mechanism behind the LOI approach, and not for its implementation, we have reviewed several
concerns that relate to its successful implementation, namely, credibility of regulatory commitments,
and informational requirements.
Despite its strong inﬂuence in the regulation of the electronic communications sector, the LOI
approach still lacks some economic foundations. The mechanism, itself, seems to have prospects in
broadband markets if one can overcome the problems related to its implementation. Given the current
discussions on whether the implementation of LOI should be extended to symmetric markets, such as
next generation ﬁber optic networks, further research—both theoretical and empirical–is indispensable.
Finally, in this paper we have focused on the original LOI approach, with which entrants are
provided access to the incumbent’s infrastructure one level at a time. A modiﬁed version of the
approach–that which ensures multiple access levels at any given time–is embraced in the policy
arena. Therefore, further research is needed to improve our understanding of how the underlying
diﬀerences between the two approaches matter, both in terms of the working mechanism and the
implementation of the LOI.
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